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Abstract
We demonstrate the existence of universal adversarial perturbations, which can
fool a family of audio processing architectures, for both targeted and untargeted
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on generating universal
adversarial perturbations for audio processing systems. We propose two methods
for finding such perturbations. The first method is based on an iterative, greedy
approach that is well-known in computer vision: it aggregates small perturbations
to the input so as to push it to the decision boundary. The second method, which
is the main technical contribution of this work, is a novel penalty formulation,
which finds targeted and untargeted universal adversarial perturbations. Differently
from the greedy approach, the penalty method minimizes an appropriate objective
function on a batch of samples. Therefore, it produces more successful attacks when
the number of training samples is limited. Moreover, we provide a proof that the
proposed penalty method theoretically converges to a solution that corresponds to
universal adversarial perturbations. We report comprehensive experiments, showing
attack success rates higher than 91.1% and 74.7% for targeted and untargeted
attacks, respectively.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models achieve state-of-the-art performance in various problems, notably in image
recognition [1], natural language processing [2, 3] and speech processing [4, 5]. However, recent
studies have demonstrated that such systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [6–9]. Adversarial
examples are carefully perturbed input samples that can fool the detection system at test time [10, 6],
posing security and reliability concerns for such systems. The threat of such attacks have been mainly
addressed for computer vision tasks [9].
End-to-end audio processing systems have been gaining more attention recently [11–14]. In such
systems, the input to the classifier is the audio signal. Moreover, there have been some studies that
embed traditional signal processing techniques into the layers of Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) [15–17]. For such audio processing systems, the effect of adversarial attacks is not widely
addressed [18]. Creating attacks on audio processing systems is challenging, due mainly to the signal
variability in the time domain [18].
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [19] have shown the existence of universal adversarial perturbation, which,
when added to an input image, causes the input to be misclassified with high probability. For these
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universal attacks, the generated vector is independent from the input samples. However, to our
knowledge, the existence of such vectors for audio classifiers has not been studied yet [18].
In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of universal adversarial perturbations, which can fool
a family of audio processing architectures, for both targeted and untargeted attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study on generating universal adversarial perturbations for audio
processing systems. We propose two methods for finding such perturbations. The first method is
based on the greedy-approach principle of [19]: it finds the minimum perturbation that sends the
samples to the decision boundary. The second method, which is the main technical contribution of
this work, is a novel penalty formulation, which finds targeted and untargeted universal adversarial
perturbations. Differently from the greedy approach, the penalty method minimizes an appropriate
objective function on a batch of samples. Therefore, it produces more successful attacks when the
number of training samples are limited. Moreover, we provide a proof that the proposed penalty
method theoretically converges to a solution that corresponds to universal adversarial perturbations.
Both methods are evaluated on a family of audio classifiers based on deep models for environmental
sound classification. The experimental results have shown that both methods can attack the target
models with a high success rate.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of adversarial attacks on deep
learning models. Section 3 presents the proposed methods to craft universal audio adversarial
perturbations. Section 4 presents the dataset and the target models used to evaluate the proposed
methods, while the experimental results are presented in Section 5. The conclusion and perspective
of future work is presented in the last section.
2 Adversarial Machine Learning
Research on adversarial attacks has attracted considerable attention recently, due to its impact on the
reliability of a breadth of deep learning models. These attacks were mostly investigated in computer
vision [8]. For a given image x, an attack can find a small perturbation δ, often imperceptible
to a human observer, so that a sample x˜ = x + δ is misclassified by a deep network [6, 20, 21].
The attacker’s goal may cover a wide range of threats like privacy violation, availability violation
and integrity violation [10]. Moreover, the attacker’s goal may be specific (targeted), with samples
misclassified as a specific class or generic (untargeted), where the attacker simply wants to have a
sample classified differently from the true class [10]. Attacks generated by targeting one classifier
are often transferable to other classifiers (i.e. induce misclassification on them) [22], even if they
have different architectures and do not use the same training set [6]. It was later shown that such
attacks can also be applied in the physical world. For instance, Kurakin et al. [23] showed that
printed adversarial examples were still misclassified after being captured by a camera; Athalye et
al. [24] presented a method to generate adversarial examples that are robust under translation and
scale transformations, showing that such attacks induce misclassification even when the samples
correspond to different viewpoints.
Research on adversarial attacks on audio classification systems is quite recent. Some studies focused
mainly on providing inaudible and hidden targeted attacks on the systems. In such attacks, new audio
samples are synthesized, instead of adding perturbations to actual input samples [25, 26]. Other
works focus on untargeted attacks on speech and music processing systems [27, 28]. Du et al. [29]
proposed a method based on Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) for targeted and untargeted attacks.
They evaluated their attacks on a range of applications like speech command recognition, speaker
recognition, sound event detection and music genre classification. Alzantot et al. [30] proposed a
similar approach that uses a genetic algorithm for crafting targeted black-box attacks on a speech
command classification system [31], which achieved 87% of success. Carlini et al. [18] proposed
a targeted attack on the speech processing system DeepSpeech [11], which is a state-of-the-art
speech-to-text transcription neural network. A penalty method is used in such attacks, which achieved
100% of success. Most studies consider that the attacker can directly manipulate the input samples of
the classifiers. Crafting audio attacks that can work on the physical world (i.e. played over-the-air)
presents challenges such as being robust to background noise and reverberations. Yakura et al. [32]
showed that over-the-air attacks are possible, at least for a dataset of short phrases. Qin et al. [33]
also reported successful adversarial attacks on automatic speech recognition system, which remain
effective after applying realistic simulated environmental distortions.
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Universal adversarial perturbations are effective type of attacks [19] because they can be generated
once since the additive noise is independent of the input samples, and it can cause any sample to
be misclassified by a deep model. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [19] proposed a greedy algorithm to
provide such perturbations for untargeted attacks. The perturbation is generated by aggregating
atomic perturbation vectors, which send the data points to the decision boundary of the classifier.
Recently, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [34] provided a formal relationship between the geometry of the
decision boundary and robustness to universal perturbations. They have also shown theoretically the
strong vulnerability of state-of-the-art deep models to universal perturbations. Metzen et al. [35]
generalized this idea to provide attacks against semantic image segmentation models. Recently,
Behjati et al. [36] generalized this idea to attack a text classifier in both targeted and non-targeted
scenarios. In a different approach, Hayes et al. [37] proposed a generative model for providing such
universal perturbations. For audio processing systems, the impact of such perturbations can be very
strong if these perturbations can be played over the air even without knowing what the test samples
would look like. Although some robust adversarial audio attacks have been proposed, most of them
are untargeted attacks that aim at fooling a classifier. Besides, most of the attacks consider specific
target architectures.
3 Universal Audio Adversarial Perturbations
In this section, we formalize the problem of crafting universal audio adversarial perturbations, and
propose two methods for finding such perturbations. The first method is based on the greedy-approach
principle of [19]: it finds the minimum perturbation that sends the samples to the decision boundary
of the classifier or inside the boundary of the target class for untargeted and targeted perturbations.
The second method, which is the main technical contribution of this work, is a penalty formulation,
which finds a universal perturbation vector that minimizes an objective function.
Let µ be the distribution of audio samples in Rd and kˆ(x) = arg maxy P (y|x, θ) be a classifier that
predicts the correct class of the audio sample x, where y is the true label of x and θ denotes the
parameters of the classifier. Our goal is to find a vector v that once added to the audio samples
can fool the classifier for most of the samples. This perturbation vector is called universal as it is a
fixed noise that is independent of the audio samples and therefore it can be added to any sample in
order to fool a classifier. The problem can be defined such that kˆ(x + v) 6= kˆ(x) and for a targeted
attack, kˆ(x + v) = yt, where yt denotes the target class. In this context, the universal perturbation
is a vector with a sufficiently small lp norm, where p ∈ [1,∞), which satisfies two constraints [19]:
‖v‖p ≤ ξ and Px∼µ(kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x)) ≥ 1− δ, where ξ controls the magnitude of the perturbation
and δ controls the desired fooling rate. For a targeted attack, the second constraint is defined as
Px∼µ(kˆ(x + v) = yt) ≥ 1− δ.
3.1 Iterative Greedy Algorithm
Let X = {x1, . . . ,xm} be a set of m audio files sampled from the distribution µ. The greedy
algorithm proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [19] gradually crafts adversarial perturbations in an
iterative manner. For untargeted attacks, at each iteration the algorithm finds the minimal perturbation
∆vi that pushes the sample xi to the decision boundary and adds the current perturbation to the
universal perturbation. In this study, a targeted version of the algorithm is also proposed such that the
universal perturbation added to the sample must push it inside the decision boundary of the target
class. In more details, if the universal perturbation does not fool the sample, an extra ∆vi is found
and aggregated to the universal perturbation by solving the following minimization problems for
untargeted and targeted respectively:
∆vi ← arg min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ (xi + v + r) 6= kˆ (xi) , (1)
∆vi ← arg min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ (xi + v + r) = yt, (2)
In order to find ∆vi for each sample of the dataset, any attack that misclassifies the sample such as
Carlini and Wanger L2 attack [8] or Decoupled Direction and Norm (DDN) attack [38] can be used.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [39] used Deepfool for finding such a vector.
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In order to satisfy the first constraint (||v‖p ≤ ξ), the universal perturbation is projected on lp ball of
radius ξ and centered at 0. The projection is formulated as:
Pp,ξ(v) = arg min
v′
‖v − v′‖2 s.t. ‖v′‖p ≤ ξ (3)
The termination criteria for the algorithm is defined such that the fooling rate on the perturbed training
set exceeds a threshold 1− δ. In this protocol, the algorithm stops for untargeted perturbations when:
Err (X,v) :=
1
m
m∑
i=1
1kˆ(xi+v)6=kˆ(xi) ≥ 1− δ (4)
For a targeted attack, we replace the inequality kˆ (xi + v) 6= kˆ(xi) by kˆ (xi + v) = yt in Equation 4.
3.2 Proposed Penalty Method
In this section a penalty method is proposed to find the solution of crafting universal adversarial
perturbations. The method minimizes an appropriate objective function on a batch of samples from a
dataset. In case of noise perception in audio systems, the level of noise perception can be measured
using a realistic metric such as decibel (dB) [18]. Therefore, dB is used instead of Lp norm. In
this study, such a measure is used as one of the targets of the optimization problem and one of the
goals is to minimize the pressure level of the perturbation which is measured in dB. The problem of
crafting a universal perturbation in a targeted attack can be reformulated as the following constrained
optimization problem:
min dB(v)
s.t. yt = argmaxy P (y|xi + v, θ) and 0 ≤ xi + v ≤ 1 ∀i (5)
where θ denotes the hyperparameters of the classifier. For untargeted attacks, we use yi 6=
arg maxy P (y|xi + v, θ), where yi is the true label of the sample. The constraint on v is proposed to
ensure that the modification on the original signal produces a valid range. This box constraint should
be valid for all audio samples: 0 ≤ xi + v ≤ 1. The power of noise in dB is computed as follows:
dB(v) = 20 logP (v), (6)
where P (v) is the power of the signal of length N , which is given by:
P (v) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
n=1
v2n, (7)
where vn denotes the nth component of vector v. We introduce a new parameter w to ensure that the
box constraint of the problem is held:
wi =
1
2
(tanh(xi + v) + 1), (8)
Since −1 ≤ tanh(xi + v) ≤ 1 then 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 and the solution will be valid according to the
box constraint. To solve this optimization problem, we propose a penalty method that optimizes the
following objective function:
L(wi,v; t) = min {dB(v) + c.G(wi)} , G(wi) = max(maxj 6=t {f(wi)j} − f(wi)t,−κ)
(9)
where t is the target class, f(wi)j is the output of the pre-softmax layer (logit) of the neural network
for class j, and κ is a confidence value that controls the confidence level of sample misclassification.
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This formulation enables the attacker to control the confidence level of the attack. For untargeted
attacks, we modify the objective function in Eq. (9) as follows:
L(wi,v; yi) = min {dB(v) + c.G(wi)} , G(wi) = max(f(wi)yi −maxj 6=yi {f(wi)j} ,−κ)
(10)
where yi is the true label for the ith sample of the batch. At iteration k, the algorithm solves the
unconstrained minimization problem, vk = arg minv {dB(v) + c.G(wi)}. Function G(wi) is a
penalty function which for targeted attack with κ = 0, must satisfy:
G(wi) = 0 if yt = arg max
y
P(y|xi + v, θ),
G(wi) > 0 if yt 6= arg max
y
P(y|xi + v, θ), (11)
The same properties of the penalty function are also valid for untargeted perturbations.
The Adam optimization algorithm [40] is used to minimize this objective function. Several other
optimization algorithms like AdaGrad [41], standard gradient descent, gradient descent with Nesterov
momentum [42] and RMSProp [43] were also evaluated. They produce relatively similar solutions
but Adam was selected since it converges in fewer iterations.
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) is used as a metric to measure the level of the noise with respect to the
original signal. This metric is used for measuring the level of the perturbation on the signal after
adding the universal perturbation. This measure is also used in previous works for evaluating the
quality of the generated adversarial audio attacks [28, 29]. This measure is defined as:
SNRdB(x,v) = 20. log10
P (x)
P (v)
(12)
where P (.) is the power of the signal defined in Eq. (7). Higher SNRs indicate that lower level of
noise is added to the audio sample by the universal adversarial perturbation.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of the proposed penalty method. The algorithm minimizes
the objective function introduced in Eq. (9) or Eq. 10 using a set of training samples and the Adam
optimizer [40, 43].
Theorem 1: Let
{
vk
}
, k = 1, ...,∞ be the sequence generated by the proposed penalty method in
Algorithm 1. Let v¯ be the limit point of
{
vk
}
. Then any limit point of the sequence is a solution to
the original optimization problem defined in Eq. (5).
Proof: Refer to supplementary material.
4 Experimental Protocol
The UrbanSound8k dataset [44] is used for training the target models and crafting the adversarial
attacks. This dataset consists of 7.3 hours of audio recordings split into 8,732 audio clips of up to four
seconds. For this study, we have used about three-second audio segments downsampled to 16 kHz
for training and evaluating the models as well as for generating adversarial perturbations. Therefore,
each audio sample is represented by a 50,999-dimensional array. The dataset was split into training
(80%), validation (10%) and test (10%). For generating perturbations, 1,000 samples of the training
set were randomly selected and the perturbations were evaluated on the whole test set (874 samples).
We have chosen a family of diverse end-to-end architectures as our target models. This selection is
based on choosing architectures which might learn representations directly from the audio signal. We
briefly describe the architecture of each model as follows. A detailed description of the architectures
can be found in supplementary material.
1D CNN Rand [45]: This model consists of five one-dimensional convolutional layers (CL). The
output of CLs is used as input to two fully connected (FC) layers followed by an output layer with
softmax activation function. The weights of all of the layers are initialized randomly. This model is
proposed by Abdoli et al. [45] for environmental sound classification.
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Algorithm 1: Penalty method for universal adversarial audio perturbations.
Input: Data points X = {x1, . . . ,xm} with corresponding original labels Y , desired fooling rate on
perturbed samples δ, Target class t (for targeted attacks)
Output: Universal perturbation signal v
1 initialize v← 0,
2 while Err (X,v) ≤ 1− δ do
3 Sample a mini-batch of size S from (X,Y )
4 g← 0
5 for i← 1 to S do
6 Compute the transformation of the perturbed signal for each sample i from mini-batch:
wi =
1
2 (tanh(xi + v) + 1),
Compute the gradient of the objective function, i.e., Eq. (9) or Eq. (10), w.r.t. wi:
7 if targeted attack: then
8 g← g + ∂L(wi,v;t)∂wi
else
9 g← g + ∂L(wi,v;yi)∂wi
10 Compute update ∆v using g according to the Adam update rule [40]
11 apply update: v← v + ∆v
return v
1D CNN Gamma [45]: This model is similar to 1D CNN Rand except that it employs a Gammatone
filter-bank at the first layer of the model. Furthermore, this layer is kept frozen during the training
process. Gammatone filters are used to decompose the input signal to appropriate frequency bands.
This model is also proposed by Abdoli et al. [45] for environmental sound classification.
ENVnet-V2: Tokozume et al. [46] proposed an architecture for sound recognition. The model was
slightly modified to make it compatible with the input size of the samples of UrbanSound8k dataset.
This architecture uses raw audio signal as input. This model extracts short-time frequency features by
using two one-dimensional CLs followed by a pooling layer (PL). It then swaps axes and convolves
the features in time and frequency domain using five two-dimensional CLs. After, two FC layers and
an output layer with softmax activation function complete the network.
SincNet: Ravanelli et al. [15] proposed an end-to-end architecture for sound processing which
extracts from the audio signal meaningful features at the first layer. In this model, several sinc
functions are used as band-pass filters and only low and high cutoff frequencies are learned from
audio. After that, two one-dimensional CLs are applied. Two FC layers followed by a output layer
with softmax activation are used for classification.
SincNet+VGG19: This model uses sinc filters to extract features from the raw audio signal as in
SincNet [15]. After applying one-dimensional maxpooling layer the output is stacked along time axis
to form a 2D representation. This time-frequency representation is used as the input to a VGG19 [47]
network followed by a FC layer and an output layer with softmax activation for classification. This
time-frequency representation resembles spectrogram representation of the audio signal.
For the iterative method, several parameters must be chosen. In order to find the minimal perturbation
∆vi, we used the DDN L2 attack [38]. This attack is designed to efficiently find small perturbations
that fool the model. The difference with DeepFool [39] is that it can be used for both untargeted
and targeted attacks, extending the iterative method to the targeted scenario. DDN was used with a
budget of 50 steps and an initial norm of 0.2. Results are reported for p =∞ and we set ξ = 0.09.
This value is set to craft perturbations in which the norm is much lower than the norm of the audio
samples in the dataset 1.
For evaluating the penalty method, we set the penalty term c = 0.002 and the confidence value κ = 5
for all models. Figure 1 shows the effect of different confidence values on both mean Attack Success
Rate (ASR) and mean SNR for targeted and untargeted attacks on the ENVnet-V2 model [46] for the
test set. As shown in Equation 4, ASR is defined by dividing the number of the misclassified samples
1the l∞ norm of the samples of the dataset is 0.88.
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Figure 1: Effect of different confidence values on (a) mean ASR and (b) mean SNR for targeted and
untargeted attacks. ENVnet-V2 [46] is used as target model.
by the total number of samples. For this experiment, only 500 training samples are used. For targeted
attacks, the target class is "Gun shot". Figure 1 shows that the confidence value increases as the ASR
increases. However, the SNR also decreases in the same way. For both iterative and penalty methods,
we set the desired fooling rate on perturbed training samples to δ = 0.1. Both algorithms terminate
execution whether they achieve the desired fooling ratio or they reach 100 iterations. Both algorithms
have been trained and tested using a TITAN Xp GPU.
Targeted Attack Untargeted Attack
Training Set Test Set Training Set Test Set
Method Model ASR ASR SNR (dB) ASR ASR SNR (dB)
Iterative
1D CNN Rand 0.982 0.959 16.428 0.909 0.858 16.793
1D CNN Gamma 0.983 0.911 17.373 0.927 0.747 16.065
ENVnet-V2 0.984 0.961 17.983 0.924 0.773 15.415
SincNet 1.000 0.999 19.317 0.915 0.933 16.979
SincNet+VGG19 0.990 0.973 19.083 0.911 0.845 19.616
Penalty
1D CNN Rand 0.961 0.954 15.967 0.921 0.897 15.270
1D CNN Gamma 0.954 0.927 16.169 0.917 0.810 15.659
ENVnet-V2 0.971 0.952 16.990 0.912 0.875 18.029
SincNet 0.998 1.000 17.988 0.911 0.947 15.910
SincNet+VGG19 0.945 0.940 17.709 0.918 0.881 17.393
Table 1: Mean ASR and mean SNR on train and test sets for untargeted and targeted perturbations.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the results of the iterative and penalty-based methods against the 5 models considered
in this study. We evaluate both targeted and untargeted attacks in terms of mean ASR (Attack Success
Ratio) on training and test set, as well as mean SNR (Signal to Noise ratio) of the perturbed samples of
the test set. For targeted attacks, the iterative method produced a slightly better ASR for targeting 1D
CNN Rand, ENVnet-V2 and SincNet+VGG19 models, while the penalty method produces slightly
higher ASR for targeting 1D CNN Gamma and SincNet. Both methods produce relatively similar
mean SNR on the test set.
For both methods, the crafted universal perturbations generalize well to the test set, and we observe
a relatively low difference in ASR on the training and test sets. Table 1 also shows the results of
untargeted universal adversarial perturbations on target models. The penalty method produces better
mean ASR on test set for targeting all of the proposed target models. Similar to targeted attack
scenario, there is no significant difference between the mean SNR of the perturbed audio signals
produced by two models. Here, it is also observed that perturbation vectors produced on the training
set is well transferable to the test set. The detailed results of the targeted attack scenario for each
model is reported in the supplementary material.
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Figure 2: Targeted and untargeted attack success rate and mean SNR on the test set versus the number
of training data points. Targeted attack: (a) ASR on 1D CNN Gamma model; (b) mean SNR on
inputs of 1D CNN Gamma model. Untargeted attack: (c) ASR on SincNet; (d) mean SNR on inputs
of SincNet.
We now consider the influence of the number of training data points on the quality of the universal
perturbations. Figure 2 shows the ASR and mean SNR achieved on the test set with different number
of data points, considering two target models. Untargeted attack is evaluated on SincNet and targeted
attack is evaluated on 1D CNN Gamma model. For targeted attack, the target class is "Gun shot". For
both targeted and untargeted scenarios, penalty method produces better ASR when the perturbations
are crafted with a lower number of data points. Iterative model produces perturbations with a slightly
better mean SNR. However, this difference is perceptually negligible. For a better assessment of the
perturbations produced by both proposed methods, several randomly chosen examples of perturbed
audio samples are presented in supplementary material.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, we proposed an iterative method and a penalty method for generating targeted and
untargeted universal adversarial audio perturbations. Both methods were used for attacking a diverse
family of end-to-end audio classifiers based on deep models and the experimental results have shown
that both methods can easily fool all models with a high success rate. It is also mathematically proven
that the proposed penalty method converges to an optimal solution.
Although the generated perturbations can target the models with high success rate. In listening tests,
the additive noise to the audio signal is detectable. Developing effective universal adversarial audio
examples by the use of principle of auditory masking [33] to reduce the level of noise introduced by
the adversarial perturbation is our current goal.
Different from image-based universal adversarial perturbations [48], the universal audio perturbations
crafted in this study do not perform well in the physical world (played over-the-air). Combining the
methods proposed in this paper with recent studies on generating robust adversarial attacks on several
transformations on the audio signal [32, 33] may be a promising way to craft robust physical attacks
against audio systems.
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Moreover, conducting an extensive study of the transferability of the universal perturbations over
proposed models is also an important direction for future work. The transferability of perturbations
may be examined for targeted and untargeted scenarios [49].
Finally, proposing a defensive mechanism against such universal perturbations is also an important
problem. Using methods like adversarial training [50] against such attacks is also considered as one
of our future research directions.
Supplementary Material
A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1: Let
{
vk
}
, k = 1, ...,∞, be the sequence generated by the proposed penalty method.
Let v¯ be the limit point of
{
vk
}
, then any limit point of the sequence is a solution to the original
optimization problem:
min dB(v)
s.t. yt = arg maxy P (y|xi + v, θ)
and
0 ≤ xi + v ≤ 1 ∀xi.
(13)
Before proving the Theorem 1, a useful lemma is presented and proved.
Lemma 1: let v∗ be the optimal value of the original constrained problem defined in Eq. (5). Then
dB (v∗) ≥ L (wki ,vk; t) ≥ dB (vk)∀k.
Proof of Lemma 1:
dB(v∗) = dB(v∗) + c.G(w∗i ) (∵ G(w∗i ) = 0)
≥ dB(vk) + c.G(wki ) (∵ c > 0, G(wki ) ≥ 0,wki minimizes L(wki ,vk; t))
≥ dB(vk)
∴ dB(v∗) ≥ L(wki ,vk; t) ≥ dB(vk)∀k
Proof of Theorem 1. dB is a monotonically increasing function and continuous. Also, G is a hinge
function, which is continuous. L is the summation of two continuous functions. Therefore, it is also
a continuous function. The limit point of
{
vk
}
is defined as: v¯ = limk→∞ vk and since function
dB is a continuous function, dB(v¯) = limk→∞ dB(vk). We can conclude that:
L∗ = limk→∞ L(wki ,v
k; t) ≤ dB(v∗) (∵ Lemma1)
⇒ L∗ = limk→∞ dB(vk) + limk→∞ c.G(wki ) ≤ dB(v∗)
⇒ L∗ = dB(v¯) + limk→∞ c.G(wki ) ≤ dB(v∗)
If vk is a feasible point for the constrained optimization problem defined in Eq. (5), then, from the
definition of function G(.), one can conclude that limk→∞ c.G(wki ) = 0. Then:
L∗ = dB(v¯) ≤ dB(v∗)
∴ v¯ is a solution of the problem defined in Eq. (5)
B Target models
In this study five types of models are targeted. For training all of the models categorical crossentropy
is used as loss function and Adadelta [51] is used for optimizing the parameters of the models. In this
section the complete description of the models is presented.
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B.1 1D CNN Rand
Table 2 shows the configuration of 1D CNN Rand [45]. This model consists of 5 one dimensional
convolutional layers. The number of the kernels of each convolutional layer is 16, 32, 64, 128 and
256. The size of the feature maps of each convolutional layer is 64, 32, 16, eight and four. The first,
second and fifth convolutional layers are followed by a one dimensional max-pooling layer of size
of eight, eight and four, respectively. The output of the second pooling layer is used as input to two
Fully Connected (FC) layers on which a drop-out with probability of 0.5 is applied for both layers
[52]. Relu is used as the activation function for all of the layers. The number of the neurons of the
FC layers are 128 and 64. In order to reduce the over-fitting, batch normalization is applied after the
activation function of each convolution layer [53]. The output of last fully connected layer is used as
the input to a softmax layer with ten neurons for classification.
Layer Ksize Stride # of filters Data shape
InputLayer - - - (50,999, 1)
Conv1D 64 2 16 (25,468, 16)
MaxPooling1D 8 8 16 (3,183, 16)
Conv1D 32 2 32 (1,576, 32)
MaxPooling1D 8 8 32 (197, 32)
Conv1D 16 2 64 (91, 64)
Conv1D 8 2 128 (42, 128)
Conv1D 4 2 256 (20, 256)
MaxPooling1D 4 4 128 (5, 256)
FC - - 128 (128)
FC - - 64 (64)
FC - - 10 (10)
Table 2: 1D CNN Rand architecture.
B.2 1D CNN Gamma
This model is similar to 1D CNN Rand except a gammatone filter-bank is used for initialization of
the filters of the first layer of this model [45]. Table 3 shows the configuration of this model. The
filters of gammatone filter-bank is not trained during the backpropagation process. Sixty four filters
are used to decompose the input signal into appropriate frequency bands. This filter-bank covers the
frequency range between 100Hz to 8 kHz. After this layer, batch normalization is also applied [53].
B.3 ENVnet-V2
Table 4 shows the architecture of ENVnet-V2 [46]. This model extracts short-time frequency features
from audio file by using two one dimensional convolutional layers each with 32 and 64 filters followed
Layer Ksize Stride # of filters Data shape
InputLayer - - - (50,999, 1)
Conv1D 512 1 64 (50,488, 64)
MaxPooling1D 8 8 64 (6,311, 64)
Conv1D 32 2 32 (3,140, 32)
MaxPooling1D 8 8 32 (392, 32)
Conv1D 16 2 64 (189, 64)
Conv1D 8 2 128 (91, 128)
Conv1D 4 2 256 (44, 256)
MaxPooling1D 4 4 128 (11, 256)
FC - - 128 (128)
FC - - 64 (64)
FC - - 10 (10)
Table 3: 1D CNN Gamma architecture
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Layer Ksize Stride # of filters Data shape
InputLayer - - - (50,999, 1)
Conv1D 64 2 32 (25,468, 32)
Conv1D 16 2 64 (12,727, 64)
MaxPooling1D 64 64 64 (198, 64)
swapaxes - - - (64, 198, 1)
Conv2D (8,8) (1,1) 32 (57, 191, 32)
Conv2D (8,8) (1,1) 32 (50, 184, 32)
MaxPooling2D (5,3) (5,3) 32 (10, 61, 32)
Conv2D (1,4) (1,1) 64 (10, 58, 64)
Conv2D (1,4) (1,1) 64 (10, 55, 64)
MaxPooling2D (1,2) (1,2) 64 (10, 27, 64)
Conv2D (1,2) (1,1) 128 (10, 26, 128)
FC - - 4,096 (4,096)
FC - - 4,096 (4,096)
FC - - 10 (10)
Table 4: ENVnet-V2 architecture
Layer Ksize Stride # of filters Data shape
InputLayer - - - (50,999, 1)
SincConv1D 251 1 80 (50,749, 80)
MaxPooling1D 3 1 80 (16,916, 80)
Conv1D 5 1 60 (16,912, 60)
MaxPooling1D 3 1 60 (5,637, 60)
Conv1D 5 1 60 (5,633, 60)
FC - - 128 (128)
FC - - 64 (64)
FC - - 10 (10)
Table 5: SincNet architecture
by a one dimensional max-pooling layer. The model then swaps axes and convolve the features in
time and frequency domain by the use of two two-dimensional convolutional layers each with 32
filters. After convolutional layers, a two dimensional max-pooling layer is used. After that, two other
two dimensional convolutional layers followed by a max-pooling layer are used. After that, another
two dimensional convolutional layer with 128 filters is used. After using two FC layers with 4096
neurons, a softmax layer is applied for classification. Drop-out with probability of 0.5 is also applied
on FC layers [52]. Relu is also used as the activation function for all of the layers.
B.4 SincNet
Table 5 shows the architecture of SincNet [15]. In this model, 80 sinc functions are used as band-
pass filters for decomposing the audio signal into appropriate frequency bands. After that, two
one-dimenstional convolutional layers with 80 and 60 filters are applied. Layer normalization [54]
is also used after each convolutional layer. After each covolutional layer, max-pooling is also used.
Two FC layers followed by a softmax layer is used for classification. Drop-out with probability of 0.5
is also used on FC layers [52]. Batch normalization [53] is also used after FC layers. In this model,
all hidden layers use leaky-ReLU [55] non-linearities.
B.5 SincNet+VGG19
Table 6 shows the specification of this architecture. This model uses 227 Sinc filters to extract
features from the raw audio signal as it is introduced in SincNet [15]. After applying one-dimensional
max-poolig layer of size of 218 with stride of one, and layer normalization [54], the output is stacked
along time axis to form a 2D representation. This time-frequency representation is used as the input
to a VGG19 [47] network followed by a FC layer and softmax layer for classification. The parameters
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Layer Ksize Stride # of filters Data shape
InputLayer - - - (50,999, 1)
SincConv1D 251 1 227 (50,749, 1)
MaxPooling1D 218 1 227 (232, 1)
Reshape - - - (232, 227, 1)
VGG19 [47] - - - (7, 7, 512)
FC - - 10 (10)
Table 6: SincNet+VGG19 architecture
of the VGG19 is the same as described in [47] and they are not changed in this study. The output of
VGG19 is used as the input of a softmax layer with ten neurons for classification.
C Audio examples
Several randomly chosen examples of perturbed audio samples of Urbansound8k dataset [44] are also
presented. The audio samples are perturbed based on two presented methods in this study. Targeted
and untargeted perturbations are considered. Table 7 shows a list of the samples. Methodology of
crafting the samples, target models, and also detected class of the sample by each model as well as
the true class of the samples are presented.
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Sample Detected Class True Class Target Model Method Targeted/Untargeted
JA_0_org.wav jackhammer jackhammer SINCNet N/A N/A
JA_0_pert_pen.wav gun_shot jackhammer SINCNet penalty targeted
JA_0_pert_itr.wav gun_shot jackhammer SINCNet iterative targeted
SI_0_org.wav siren siren SINCNet N/A N/A
SI_0_pert_itr.wav car_horn siren SINCNet iterative targeted
SI_0_pert_pen.wav car_horn siren SINCNet penalty targeted
ST_0_org.wav street_music street_music SINCNet N/A N/A
ST_0_pert_pen.wav air_conditioner street_music SINCNet penalty targeted
ST_0_pert_itr.wav air_conditioner street_music SINCNet iterative targeted
DR_0_org.wav drilling drilling SINCNet N/A N/A
DR_0_pert_pen.wav siren drilling SINCNet penalty targeted
DR_0_pert_itr.wav siren drilling SINCNet iterative targeted
CA_0_org.wav car_horn car_horn SINCNet+VGG N/A N/A
CA_0_pert_itr.wav siren car_horn SINCNet+VGG iterative targeted
CA_0_pert_pen.wav siren car_horn SINCNet+VGG penalty targeted
JA_1_org.wav jackhammer jackhammer SINCNet+VGG N/A N/A
JA_1_pert_itr.wav dog_bark jackhammer SINCNet+VGG iterative untargeted
JA_1_pert_pen.wav children_playing jackhammer SINCNet+VGG penalty untargeted
EN_0_org.wav engine_idling engine_idling SINCNet+VGG N/A N/A
EN_0_pert_itr.wav drilling engine_idling SINCNet+VGG iterative untargeted
EN_0_pert_pen.wav drilling engine_idling SINCNet+VGG penalty untargeted
CA_1_org.wav car_horn car_horn SINCNet+VGG N/A N/A
CA_1_pert_pen.wav drilling car_horn SINCNet+VGG penalty untargeted
CA_1_pert_itr.wav drilling car_horn SINCNet+VGG iterative untargeted
SI_1_org.wav siren siren SINCNet+VGG N/A N/A
SI_1_pert_itr.wav street_music siren SINCNet+VGG iterative untargeted
SI_1_pert_pen.wav children_playing siren SINCNet+VGG penalty untargeted
Table 7: List of examples of perturbed audio samples, Methodology of crafting the samples, target
models, and also detected class of the sample by each model and the true class of the samples. The
audio files belong to UrbanSound8k dateset [44]. N/A: Not Applicable
D Detailed targeted attack results
Table 8 to table 12 show the detailed ASR on train set and test set on the target models in targeted
attack scenario. For each specific target class of UrbanSound8k [44] ASRs are reported. Mean SNRs
of the inputs to the models after adding universal perturbation are also reported. The target classes
are: Air conditioner (AI), Car horn (CA), Children playing (CH), Dog bark (DO), Drilling (DR),
Engine (EN) idling, Gun shot (GU), Jackhammer (JA), Siren (SI), Street music (ST).
Target Classes
Method AI CA CH DO DR EN GU JA SI ST
Iterative
ASR train set 0.943 0.997 0.953 0.994 0.996 0.994 0.988 0.977 0.990 0.996
ASR test set 0.911 0.970 0.905 0.977 0.978 0.981 0.969 0.954 0.965 0.982
SNR (dB) test set 14.760 16.520 15.519 17.839 16.681 15.735 18.389 16.165 15.673 17.006
Penalty
ASR train set 0.951 0.970 0.935 0.969 0.968 0.959 0.985 0.965 0.937 0.976
ASR test set 0.953 0.962 0.918 0.951 0.967 0.961 0.981 0.967 0.926 0.965
SNR (dB) test set 15.254 15.676 16.584 16.330 16.273 15.290 16.061 15.887 16.456 15.864
Table 8: ASR and mean SNR for targeting each label of UrbanSound8k [44] dataset. The target
model is 1D CNN Rand.
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Target Classes
Method AI CA CH DO DR EN GU JA SI ST
Iterative
ASR train set 0.943 0.997 0.953 0.994 0.996 0.994 0.988 0.977 0.990 0.996
ASR test set 0.911 0.970 0.905 0.977 0.978 0.981 0.969 0.954 0.965 0.982
SNR (dB) test set 14.760 16.520 15.519 17.839 16.681 15.735 18.389 16.165 15.673 17.006
Penalty
ASR train set 0.951 0.970 0.935 0.969 0.968 0.959 0.985 0.965 0.937 0.976
ASR test set 0.953 0.962 0.918 0.951 0.967 0.961 0.981 0.967 0.926 0.965
SNR (dB) test set 15.254 15.676 16.584 16.330 16.273 15.290 16.061 15.887 16.456 15.864
Table 9: ASR and mean SNR for targeting each label of UrbanSound8k [44] dataset. The target
model is 1D CNN Gamma.
Target Classes
Method AI CA CH DO DR EN GU JA SI ST
Iterative
ASR train set 0.992 0.977 0.980 0.993 0.975 0.993 0.979 0.979 0.991 0.982
ASR test set 0.977 0.960 0.965 0.971 0.950 0.969 0.954 0.963 0.974 0.937
SNR (dB) test set 18.373 17.374 17.791 18.450 17.492 17.989 18.321 17.953 17.896 18.192
Penalty
ASR train set 0.964 0.964 0.975 0.977 0.981 0.963 0.977 0.950 0.990 0.971
ASR test set 0.938 0.935 0.960 0.960 0.962 0.947 0.963 0.910 0.983 0.962
SNR (dB) test set 18.327 16.645 18.529 16.135 15.985 17.291 15.672 17.257 16.844 17.219
Table 10: ASR and mean SNR for targeting each label of UrbanSound8k [44] dataset. The target
model is ENVnet-V2.
Target Classes
Method AI CA CH DO DR EN GU JA SI ST
Iterative
ASR train set 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ASR test set 0.998 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.997
SNR (dB) test set 19.559 17.826 19.687 19.460 20.144 19.701 18.283 19.511 18.884 20.125
Penalty
ASR train set 1.000 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.994 0.999 0.998 1.000
ASR test set 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000
SNR (dB) test set 17.813 17.404 18.328 18.187 17.906 18.103 17.540 18.343 17.883 18.379
Table 11: ASR and mean SNR for targeting each label of UrbanSound8k [44] dataset. The target
model is SincNet.
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Target Classes
Method AI CA CH DO DR EN GU JA SI ST
Iterative
ASR train set 0.991 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.952 0.982 1.000 0.996 0.994
ASR test set 0.975 0.987 0.987 0.986 0.978 0.928 0.957 0.981 0.986 0.969
SNR (dB) test set 18.354 19.296 19.297 19.217 20.755 17.498 18.048 19.683 19.096 19.592
Penalty
ASR train set 0.960 0.965 0.974 0.900 0.982 0.906 0.950 0.968 0.931 0.916
ASR test set 0.959 0.961 0.958 0.896 0.989 0.903 0.939 0.961 0.931 0.913
SNR (dB) test set 16.968 18.293 18.049 18.448 18.373 16.270 17.037 18.103 17.733 17.819
Table 12: ASR and mean SNR for targeting each label of UrbanSound8k [44] dataset. The target
model is SincNet+VGG.
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